



Book . ..%Cl5 . 



Author 



Title 



Imprint 



OPO 16—7464 



Protestant Faith 



DWIGIIT H. OLM STEAD, 




A LECTURE 



PROTESTANT FAITH 



BY 

DwiGHT h; olmstead. 



New-York, 1874. 






Cs^Y 



e 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1874, 

By DWIGHT H. OLMSTEAD, 

in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



^-; 



f 5 5 






i 



INTRODUCTION. 



The following pages, in essentially their present 
form, were delivered as a lecture very many years 
ago, before the Young Men's Christian Union of 
New-York. The writer, although having been 
often requested to pubhsh it, has until now re- 
frained from doing so, partly in order that it 
might be subjected to his more mature judgment, 
and partly that it might await a more hospitable 
reception than the religious prejudices of the com- 
munity have heretofore been likely to accord to it. 
While aware that at this late day, many of its 
arguments are no longer new, still, he hopes its 
publication may be of service in promoting a 
higher form of religion than now obtains, and 
which he is fully persuaded will at no distant day 
prevail in the world. 

New-York, September, 1874. 



CONTENTS. 



L The Protestant Reformation how occasioned 13 

II. The Intellectual Character of the Reformation 16 

III. Free Inquiry against Authority 17 

IV. Justification b}^ Faith 21 

V. What Luther and the Reformers meant b3'- Faith 23 

VI. The Relation between Moral Obligation and Moral 

Consequences 26 

VII. The Nature of Beliefs and Opinions 33 

VIII. Concluding Remarks -46 

APPENDIX. 

Note r 67 

Note 2 . . .67 

Note 3 69 

Note 4 69 

Note 5 ., 69 

Note 6 , 70 



A LECTURE 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH, 



I. 

The Protestant Reformation how occasioned. 

The sixteenth century ushered in a period of 
great intellectual activity. The revival of literature, 
art, and science ; the brilliant maritime discoveries ; 
the prevailing spirit of controversy and enterprise ; 
but more especially the introduction of printing, 
whereby knowledge was disseminated, and made 
common to more than one nation or generation, 
had all given a new and remarkable impulse to 
human thought, distinguishing that era as an 
epoch in modern history. As men began to think 
for themselves, their first protestation, as may 
well be supposed, was against the restraint of 



14 A LECTURE ON 

thought and its authoritative dictation. The fears 
of the Vicar of Croydon were well nigh realized : 
", We must root out printing, or printing will root 
" out us." 

It must not be forgotten that for centuries the 
Roman Church had been the prominent, controlling 
power of Christendom. She did not mature in a 
day, but was " the fruit of a long array of most 
" learned men, distinguished colleges and councils, 
" sanctioned by noble martyrs and numerous mira- 
" cles." 

So much was she, for these reasons, lifted above 
the common crowd, that it is not surprising if to 
them her utterances had early the force of law, and 
that she, in turn, should count herself infallible. 

But not content with being the spiritual head, 
she aspired to temporal dominion. She demanded 
tribute from all nations, and arrayed armed legions 
for her own use ; she made and unmade kings ; she 
became the umpire of trade ; she dictated laws and 
treaties. At all Christian courts her legates took 
precedence, soon assuming to represent that divine 
right — that supreme authority — by whose sanction 
alone princes were then, as now, supposed to 
govern. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. ^5 

To this supremacy she set up the claim of pre- 
scription. Had she not for a thousand years stood 
firm on that rock whereon Christ himself had set 
her, amid changing empires, the rude assaults of 
barbarism, and the decisions of hostile councils ? 
Had not her edicts become the recognized theology 
of the greater part of the civilized world ? How 
could she be in error who could point to a history 
like this ? « 

At length her prestige began to decline ; and 
while that result was in no small degree due to the 
corruptions of the priesthood, its main cause is to 
be found in that growing mental enfranchisement 
ever since peculiarly characteristic of the Protest- 
ant nations, imparting to them a superior energy 
and intelligence, derived, as has been most truly 
said, " not from the creeds they hold, but from the 
" private liberty which accompanies the creeds."* 

Never before had the traditional pretensions and 
policy of the Church been so seriously and persis- 
tently questioned, nor ever before had so large a 
proportion of the Christian world presumed to 
assert anything contrary to her canons. But now 
the boldness of a few learned men at first, and 

* Westminster Review, Jan. 1858. 



l6 A LECTURE ON 

afterwards of the people at large, began to shake 
her authority. 

It was not that men had the right to think, but 
the undeniable, patent fact, that they did think, and 
could not help thinking and having intelligent 
opinions of their own, which gave point to the 
struggle. 

Thus arose that great conflict between Authority, 
so called, and Opinion — between the authority of 
the Pope and the opinions of the educated classes ; 
between the authority of councils and the indivi- 
dual judgment. And it need scarcely be said that 
the contest, although in the most enlightened 
countries somewhat in favor of the individual, is 
not concluded even to this day. 

♦ II. 

The Intellectual Character of the Refor- 
mation. 

The Lutheran reformation, which had, in reality, 
been impending from the time of VVyckliffe, was an 
intellectual rather than a religious movement. 
From it nothing has been gained directly for 
rclie;ion : nothing, except what has resulted from 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 1 7 

independence of thought, free speech, and the 
.present heterogeneous character of the Christian 
world — yet that is progress. 

It was not wholly a failure ; since, whatever may 
have been the theological errors of Luther, (and 
grave errors they were,) it cannot be denied that 
in the history of the present wide and fundamental 
variance between the hereditary assumptions of 
the Church and common sense, he was among 
the first who opened the gate of free inquiry, dis- 
enthralled men from a blind, unreasonable sub- 
servience to priestly rule, and directed them to 
the partial liberty they have since enjoyed. 



III. 



Free Inquiry against Authority. 

That this was the occasion and essential feature 
of the Reformation, an assertion of the right, or 
rather the recognition of the necessity of private 
judgment and interpretation, as opposed to the 
authority and dictation of the Church, it will not 
be difficult to show from the writings and disputa- 
tions of Luther himself. 

" Retract," said the Pope's legate to him at 



l8 A LECTURE ON 

Augsburg. " Retract ! acknowledge thy error, 
" whether thou believest it an error or not ! The 
" Pope commands thee to do this." * 

" Convince me," replied Luther. 

One of the conditions imposed upon Luther was 
" that he should not circulate any opinions at 
" variance with the authority of the Church." 

"Do you not know," said the cardinal to him, 
" that the Pope is above all councils V 

But " from the Pope ill informed," Luther ap- 
peals " to the Pope better informed." 

He also afterwards declared, " In what concerns 
" the word of God and the faith, every Christian is 
" as good a judge for himself as the Pope can be 
" for him." f 

This conflict between the authority of the 
Church and p^vate opinion, between the assump- 
tion of infallibility and the protest against it, was 
nowhere more marked than at the Diet at Worms, 
whereof we have Luther's own account. 

Said the Emperor's orator to him, " Martin, you 
" have assumed a tone which becomes not a man 
" of your condition You have re- 

* Michelet, Life of Luther, p. 50. 

t Michelet, Life of Luther, pp. 94, 95. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. I9 

" suscitated dogmas which have been distinctly 
" condemned by the Council of Constance, and 
" you demand to be convicted thereupon out of 
" the Scriptures. But if every one were at liberty 
" to bring back into discussion points which for 
" ages have been settled by the Church and by 
" Councils, nothing would be certain and fixed — 
" doctrine or dogma — and there would be no belief 
" which men must adhere to under pain of eternal 
" damnation. You, for instance, who to-day reject 
" the authority of the Council of Constance, to-mor- 
" row may, in like manner, proscribe all councils 
" together, and next, the Fathers and the Doctors ; 
*' and there would remain no authority whatever 
" but that individual word, which we call to wit- 
" ness, and which you also invoke." ^ 

But Luther " could only repeat what, he had al- 
" ready declared : that unless they proved to him by 
" irresistible arguments that he was in the wrong, 
" he would not go back a single inch ; that what the 
" councils had laid down was no article of faith ; that 
" councils had often erred, had often contradicted 
" each other, and that their testimony consequently 
" was not convincing/' f 

* Michelet, Life of Luther, p. 90. 
+ Michelet, Life of Luther, p. 89. 



20 A LECTURE ON 

Further, while resisting the authority of the 
Church, Luther, at the same time, claimed for his 
own opinions the weight of authority, binding not 
alone upon himself, but upon all the world beside. 

When the Zwinglians inquired of him what 
would effect a reconciliation between them, he 
answered, " Let our adversaries believe as we do." 

" We cannot," responded the Swiss. 

" Well then," replied Luther, " I abandon you to 
" God's judgment." '^ 

Robertson, in his history of Charles the Fifth, 
makes this deserved remark. " Luther, Calvin, 
" Cranmer, Knox, the founders of the reformed 
** church in their respective countries, inflicted so 
" far as they had the power and opportunity, the 
*' same punishments which were demanded against 
" their own disciples by the Church of Rome, on 
" such as called in question any article of their 
" creeds." 

" God " (said Knox) " raiseth them up to slay 
" those whom the Kirk hateth." f 

* Merle d'Aubigne, Hist. Ref. vol. IV. p. 99, 

t Attributetl to John Knox by James Grants in his novel '*■ Bothwell^ or the 
" Days of Mary Queen of Scots." 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 21 

IV. 

Justification by Faith. 

Let us now examine the peculiar but pernicious 
tenet of "justification by faith," which Luther 
advanced, and which is, to this day, the key-note of 
Protestant theology. That doctrine was thus de- 
clared by the regulations published by Joachim in 

1539: 

" That we obtain the remission of sins, justifica- 
" tion, and final and eternal salvation by the mere 
" grace of God, and only through faith in the 
" redemption of Christ, and by no worthiness, 
" work, or desert of our own." 

From time immemorial the Roman Catholic 
Church had held that the performance of duty lay 
in some act, rather than in a belief, although she 
seems never to have precisely determined the 
quahty essential to salvation. She imposed the 
condition of meritorious deeds, and buried her 
devotees in the cloister with fasting and penance, 
or sent them forth to administer to human needs, 
or perchance to die in infidel lands. Indeed, so 
much of real heroism and warlike renown was as- 
sociated and intwined with this theology of works, 



22 A LECTURE ON 

that for her to give it up was to make secular the 
splendid history of centuries. 

Luther, disgusted with the traffic in indulgences, 
the gross impositions and abandoned habits of the 
priesthood ; unable to reconcile their practices 
with their professions, or the canons of the Church 
with either ; and being, if not more spiritual, at 
least more honest or more bold than they, under- 
took to interpret the Bible for himself, according 
to his unquestionable right so to do. But in that 
interpretation he promulgated these two most fatal 
errors : First, the assumed importance of endeavor- 
ing to save the soul, whether by faith or ^ works ; 
and second, that immunity from moral punishment 
is secured by some belief 

To these same errors, common to, and the es- 
sential features of most if not all prevailing religious 
systems, let us briefly direct our attention. I shall 
endeavor to show : 

I. That the avoidance of moral consequences being 
wholly utilitarian, can be no incentive to the per- 
formance of duty ; and that an act perfonned with 
any reference to a personal benefit, is just to that ex- 
tent without merit. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. ' 23 

II. That belief is not subject to the will, but is 
involuntary, and is therefore not blameworthy. "* 

The importance and bearing of the investigation 
is obvious. For, if a personal wish and effort for 
salvation be not an act of duty, under a strict defi- 
nition of that' term, and an involuntary belief be 
not able of itself to effect that salvation, then it 
follows as a matter of course, that the inquiry com- 
mon to most Christians as well as heathen, " What 
" shall we do to be saved .^" as also their answers, 
that salvation comes by " belief," can find no place 
in a correct system of moral science. 

V. 

What Luther and the Reformers meant by 
" Faith." 

Before proceeding directly to the consideration of 
these topics, it is proper to observe that Luther and 
the reformers meant by the word " faith," (" The just 
shall live by faith,")* not a trust, a hope, a con- 
fidence, a reliance, an assurance, a sentiment, or 
the like, as suggested by some persons who have 
anticipated the arguments I shall urge, but simple 

* Galatians, iii. 11. 



24 ' A LECTURE ON 

intellectual belief or mental assent, in its plainest 
acceptation. As this may be deemed a matter of 
consequence, let us at the outset dispose of it. 

The historian, Merle d'Aubigne, informs us that 
Luther, Melanchthon, Agricola, Brientz, Justus 
Jonas, and Qsiander, " being convinced that their 
" peculiar doctrine on the Eucharist was essential 
" to salvation, they considered all those who reject- 
" ed it, as without the pale of the faith." * 

" But that faith (which makes us Christians), 
says Luther, " consists in the firm belief that 
''Jesus is the Son of God." 

He also says, " A man's sins are not pardoned 
" unless he believes that they are pardoned when 
^' the priest pronounces absolution." And again, 
" I have affirmed," says Luther, " that no man can 
" be justified before God except hy faith ; so that 
''it is necessary that a man should believe with 
" perfect confidence that he has received pardon. 
" To doubt of this grace is to reject it." 

Merle d'Aubigne also tells us that " Luther ex- 
" pressed astonishment that the Swiss divines 
"could look upon him as a Christian brother when 
" they did not believe his doctrines to be true." f 

* See also Merle d'Aubigue, Hist Ref. vol. II. p. 32. 
See Appendix. Note i. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 25 

Zwingle also says : " In every nation whosoever 
^' believes with all his heart in the Lord Jesus, is 
"accepted of God. Here truly is the Church, out 
" of which no one can be saved." 

The 44th and last article of the Athanasian creed, 
as found in modern English Prayer Books, and 
which is to this day made a test of church member- 
ship, is in these words : " This is the Catholic Faith, 
" which, except a man believe faithfully, he cannot 
"be saved." 

Take away the creeds from the churches, and 
what remains to distinguish them either as re- 
ligious organizations or from each other } The 
"essential" creeds are certainly the bond of the 
" evangelical " churches. Indeed, the difference 
between the most conservative and progressive 
sects of the present day — between Episcopalians, 
Universalists, Roman Catholics, Methodists, Bap- 
tists, Unitarians, and all other denominations — is 
marked solely and entirely by differences of opin- 
ion. That is what really keeps them apart, and 
not any principle, nor their forms of worship. So, 
however faith in the abstract may be defined, it is 
a matter of little moment, since the actual fact ap- 
pears to be, that diversities of opinion, or simple 



26 A LECTURE ON 

intellectual beliefs, and not sentimentalities, or 
emotions, or purposes divide religious bodies. 

If the word "faith" had come to have a different 
signification from what it possessed at the time of 
the Reformation (which it has not), it would only 
prove that Luther and Calvin were not the fathers 
of modern theology. 

It might be shown, if necessary, that nothing 
can be further from our volition than an en- 
gendered trust, or confidence, or any of those 
mental states proposed to be substituted for plain 
belief. But such a discussion would be foreign to 
the present purpose. 

VI. 

The Relation between Moral Obligation 
AND Moral Consequences. 

Having thus shown that the Protestant " faith" 
means practically the Protestant " belief," both as 
understood by the reformers, and by modern ac- 
ceptation, I proceed to discuss the first topic, 
namely : the tLufitness of an appeal to the sentiment 
of fear in producing religious emotion. 

" What must I do to inherit eternal life T is the 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 27 

caption of an article in the " Family Christian 
Almanac," published by the American Tract 
Society. Here follows the answer. " What must 
" I do "i By the grace of God, and according to 
" His truth, I will tell you. You must admit and 
" feel that you are a sinner, guilty, polluted, con- 
" demned, lost, and so dead in sins as to be in 

" need of eternal life." " You must 

" believe that He is the Saviour, the only Saviour, 
" able to save to the uttermost ; willing to save all 
" that will come to Him ; ready and willing to save 
" you, and to save you now ;" and much more to 
the same effect. 

Whatever may be the views and refinements of 
the more educated members of the " orthodox" 
churches, it is fair to presume that the foregoing 
quotation fairly expresses the sum total of the 
formal religion of the majority of them ; that with 
them the object of religion is to save the soul, and 
to save it by a certain prescribed belief. 

A prominent Presbyterian clergyman of Brook- 
lyn, in a published discourse, remarks : " Here is 
*' the fatal barrier that lies between their souls and 

" Heaven — unbelief" " Unbelief ex- 

" eludes a sinner from the rest of Heaven. It is 



28 A LECTURE ON 

" man's crowning sin." " The fatal 

" chasm that separates the soul from its rest, has 
" been not an immoral life, not a severe and angry 
" God, not a violated law, but unbelief — simple un- 
*' belief — a heartless, wilful, determined unbelief."* 
The conclusions hereafter arrived at, as to the 
involuntary character of beliefs and opinions suffi- 
ciently refute such theology ; but there are other 
objections to it. 

Taking the term " salvation" in the strictly 
orthodox and popular sense, namely, as the remis- 
sion of a deserved penalty, as an immunity, tem- 
poral or eternal, from bodily or spiritual suffering, 
what, it may be asked — ^judged by a moral standard 
— is the relation between the salvation of the 
human family hereafter, and their right conduct 
here 1 The ideas of right, wrong, duty, moral 
obligation, have no necessary connection with the 
notion of rewards and punishments. The senti- 
ment of duty is wholly removed from that of 
recompense. " Duty is not measured by reward."! 
The end of man's moral nature is virtue, not hap- 

*"The Promise Unrealized," by Rev. J. E. Rockwell, D.D. Published 
Sept. 1859. 

Coiisin, Hist. Mod. Phil. Vol. IT. p. 285. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 29 

piness. The punishment of self-disapproval— of 
conscience— is undoubtedly consequent on wrong 
doing, either in its earlier or later stages ; but it 
would be equally wrong doing, whether followed 
by punishment or not. As virtue is in the 
abstract independent of its rewards, so is sin in- 
dependent of its penalties. 

Looking at it in the " orthodox" view, (which is 
not admitted to be the correct one,) namely, that 
under the doctrine of free grace the accountability 
occasioned by sin is but a mere liability to account, 
the punishment is not certain, even though the 
law be broken. 

What if we err about the fact of our punish- 
ment, will that change either the fact itself, or the 
obligations imposed upon us } 

Even were our beliefs voluntary, could it, in a 
moral aspect, be of any possible avail to us to know 
the conditions of either our present or future 
existence ? for we live subject to a moral law, 
whether aware of it or not. 

" It seems enough for us," as Benjamin Franklin 
said, "that the soul will be treated with justice in 
" another life respecting its conduct in this." 

Whether mankind are to meet their deserts here 



3© A LECTURE ON 

or hereafter, or what may be their just deserts, is 
one thing ; but it is quite another how far the per- 
formance of one's duty is to be affected by a soki- 
tion of the question. 

We are enjoined by orthodox theology to attend 
to the salvation of our souls. But why should we 
do this .? The sense of duty is an authoritative 
consciousness, imperatively imposed, a voice as of 
God within us, carrying its own sanction, and 
must be obeyed, like any other law, for its own 
sake, because to us it evidently and undeniably 
commands what is right. 

Self-approval and disapproval — (which are the 
monitions of conscience,) — moral sentinels, so to 
speak, having the same relation to the spiritual 
well-being as pain has to the bodily — simply point 
to the rule of right, and are its accidents, but do 
not afford the reason of it. An action may seem 
to tend to desirable results, yet there can be no 
personal virtue in its performance unless it is per- 
formed from a sense of duty alone ; and, whoever 
acts for the sake of recompense, (as he must who 
makes the recompense a motive), is just to that 
extent not virtuous ; because the very idea of a 
virtuous act, as recognized in the mind, is that it is 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 3 1 

something to be performed wholly regardless of 
consequences. 

Virtue is disinterested, is superior to self and 
disregards it. If it does not disregard expediency 
as an end, then it is not virtue. 

Again, as before remarked, a just law vindicates 
itself — bears its own sanction — and the obligation 
to obey it does not proceed from the personal con- 
' sequences of its infraction, however lamentable 
they may be, but from its evident justness and fit- 
ness. " Right is not right because God wills it to 
" be right, but from its own reasonableness ;" 
otherwise God would be a tyrant. I ought to do a 
certain thing, or follow a certain course of action, 
because it seems to me that I ought ; because /, 
{Ego, myself) being the sole ultimate authority^ be- 
lieve it to be right. Can argument add any strength 
to that affirmation } Would not the denial of it be 
to deny what at the same time I myself affirmed ? 
Conscience therefore is not so much an instinct, 
as a declaration of the person himself in respect 
to those things which ought to be done or ought to 
be left undone ; and that affirmation being undeni- 
able by the individual himself, is on that account 
conclusive on him. 



32 A LECTURE ON 

The theology which looks to the mere salvation 
of the soul, whether from punishment, or from sin 
itself, can be defended neither on principle, nor — 
paradoxical as it may seem — on the plea of expedi- 
ency ; certainly not, if he be the happiest who is 
the most virtuous. 

Take a practical illustration : Is a child really 
better, or more virtuous, because he has refrained 
from doing an interdicted thing for fear of the 
punishment which awaited him ? and would he 
grow up under such a course of training a better 
man ? Assuredly not ; for his whole aim then, 
would be simply and entirely to enjoy as much, and 
suffer as little, as possible. He might, through this 
continual fear of punishment, form an exterior 
habit of right conduct, of outward moraUty, which 
would pass him reputably through life. But would 
he be inwardly and really a better man ? Assur- 
edly not ; and it needs only an adequate temp- 
tation to break that habit, and disprove the false 
philosophy in which he had been reared. We 
see it every day. But let the child be sound at the 
core, at the heart, without regard to what is exter- 
nal — to the husks of a base expediency ; let him 
be taught to follow, unfettered by theological sys- 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 33 

tems, the dictates of his conscience, and obey the 
divine mandate within him, and then what end 
shall there be to his noble aspirations ! He will 
be prepared to enter — aye, will actually have al- 
ready entered on immortal life. 

Alas, that so many pure natures should have 
struggled and sorrowed under so much ignorance 
and superstition in endeavoring to reconcile their 
own inward promptings with the so-called inspired, 
but really most unreasonable faith, said to have 
been " once delivered to the saints !" 



VIT. 

The Nature of Beliefs and Opinions. 

I now pass to the consideration of the second 
main proposition, viz. : that all belief is involun- 
tary, and is that which, of our own will, we can 
neither choose, change, nor control. It is there- 
fore not blameworthy. 

This position is not new, having received the 
sanction of some of the best minds in every age. 

Concerning the followers of the once famous 
Duns Scotus, Sir James Mackintosh says : " The 



34 A LECTURE ON 

" Scotists affirmed the blamelessness of erroneous 
" opinions ; a principle which is the only effectual 
" security for conscientious enquiry, for mutual 
''kindness and for public quiet."* 

Mackintosh also declares : " It is as absurd 
" to entertain an abhorrence of intellectual inferior- 
" ity or error, however extensive or mischievous, as 
" it would be to cherish a warm indignation against 
*' earthquakes or hurricanes." f 

Other writers are equally to the point. A very 
old one says : " We know that faith comes by per- 
" suasion, and is not to be controuled." J 

Another, still older, and of high authority in 
the Church, says : " Religion by compulsion is no 
" longer religion ; it must be by persuasion, and 
*' not by constraint. Religion is under no control, 
" and cannot by power be directed."§ 

Citations from more modern philosophers and 
thinkers might be added without number. A few 
will suffice : " Our will hath no power to determine 
" the knowledge of the mind one way or the other. 
" No more than in objects of sight it depends on 
" the will to see that black which appears to be yel- 

* Eth. Phil. Vol. I. p. 46. tEth. Phil. Vol. I. p. ISO. 

ij: Flechier, Bishop of Nismes, Lett. 19. § Lactantius, B. 3. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 35 

" low, or in feeling to persuade ourselves that what 
" scalds us feels cold." * 

" It does not depend on man to believe or not to 
" believe." f 
^ " It is not in our power to judge as we will." { 

" In total and absolute error all consciousness 
" perishes." § 

"Thought and belief have not yet become 
choice." II 

" Our opinions on any subject are not voluntary 
" acts but involuntary effects. "*f 

" Belief is not an act of volition." *^ 

" He [man] is impelled by the very constitution 
" of his nature, to believe if there is evidence ; and, 
" on the other hand, he is utterly unable to believe 
" if evidence is wanting." f f 

" Philosophical belief is a spontaneous assent or 
" adhesion of the mind." :|::j: 

" Be not deceived ; belief of, or mere assent to 



* Locke, " Essay on the Human Understanding," Vol. II. Chap. 13. 

t Locke, Letter on Toleration. 

t Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers, p. 545. 

§ Cousin, Hist. Mod. Phil. p. 136. 1| Hickok, Moral Phil. p. 212. 

^ Samuel Bailey, Essay on Opinions and Truth. 

** Percy Bysche Shelley. tt Upham, Treatise on the Will, p. 92. 

:l::t: Sir William Hamilton, Philosophy, p. 158. 



36 A LECTURE ON 

" the truth of propositions upon evidence is not a 
" virtue, nor unbeUef a vice ; faith is not a volun- 
" tary act, it does not depend upon the will ; every 
'' man must believe or disbelieve, whether he will 
'' or not, according as evidence appears to him. If 
" therefore men however dignified or distinguished 
" command us to believe, they are guilty of the 
"highest folly and absurdity, because it is out of 
" our power ; but if they command us to believe, 
" and annex rewards to belief, and severe penalties 
"to unbelief, then they are most wicked and im- 
" moral, because they annex rewards and punish- 
" ments to what is involuntary, and therefore nei- 
" ther rewardable or punishable." * 

These conclusions appear to be fully warranted 
for the following reasons : 

First : If belief be voluntary, why should there be 
any doubt, or uncertainty, or degrees of probability 
in the world } It is plain that were belief conse- 
quent upon the will, there need be no such thing 
as doubt ; for then one would only will to have any 
belief in order to possess it. 

Let one reflect whether he can change or choose 
his behef at pleasure ; he will find he cannot, and 

* Letter of William Pitt. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 37 

that it is beyond his power, even with a dishonest or 
evil purpose, to believe for the time otherwise than 
he does. It is true that he may and must, from 
time to time, change his belief as new evidence is 
presented to him, or as he more carefully considers 
that already before him ; but for the time being he 
cannot, if he would, believe otherwise than he does. 

Second: Belief is simply the result of thought; 
it is a mental state or condition. Its primary 
signification is to assent to*. Hence it de- 
pends wholly upon evidence ; and in the very 
same ratio as the evidence appeals to our con- 
sciousness for its reception, so is our belief. Thus 
we speak of " full," " firm," and " strong" behef— 
belief which we call knowledge — belief which ad- 
mits of doubt — and various degrees of probability. 
We may repel the evidence, but over the belief 
consequent upon that evidence, are powerless. 

Third : It will be seen, on reflection, that one 
cannot rationally retain a belief which his judg- 
ment repudiates. Therefore, one cannot rational- 
ly admit his present beliefs to be erroneous ; for 
just as soon as he thinks that they are errone- 
ous, they cease to be his beliefs ; and since he can- 

* Webster. 



38 A LECTURE ON 

not consciously err in his beliefs, his erroneous be- 
liefs are involuntary. 

From which it follows, that what in me is, for 
the time, error, does not receive that name from 
any judgment of mine, but from the judgment of 
others ; and whosoever avers that I err in opi- 
nion, assumes all the points in discussion be- 
tween us ; he substantially denies to me what he 
claims for himself, namely, authority to pass upon 
the question. 

Whence it also appears that error is ignorance ; 
an idea well expressed by Cousin : " In total and 
absolute error all consciousness perishes." 

Fou,rth : Belief is not volition or anything like 
it ; it has no more necessary connection with the 
will than the idea of number has with the idea of 
justice. 

The expression, " I believe," is conventional, and 
is used in the same manner as we say I " feel," or 
" hear" or " see" or " am." That is, the /, the 
Ego, the personality, takes cognizance of some im- 
pression on the mind or sense, observes some phe- 
nomenon, or appearance, and passes upon it autho- 
ritatively. The will appertains to the personality, 
but not to the judgment ; and while objects of 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 39 

thought, or phenomena, may, through the exercise 
of the will, or regardless of the will, be presented to 
the judgment, the conclusion of the judgment it- 
self, or, what is the same thing, the authoritative 
conclusive assertion of the Ego in respect to such 
phenomena, is involuntary. 

We can direct our attention and investigate ; but 
the results of that investigation— our conclusions — 
will stand before us regardless of our wishes or in- 
tentions in the matter. 

Abercrombie admits that "the state of mind 
" which constitutes belief is, indeed; one over which 
" the will has no direct power. But," he goes on to 
say, " belief depends upon evidence ; the result of 
" even the best evidence is entirely dependent on 
" attention ; and attention is a voluntary intellec- 
" tual state over which we have a direct and abso- 
•' lute control.* 

Dr. Chalmers states the case thus : 

" Lord Byron's assertion that ' Man is not re- 
" sponsible for his belief,' seems to have proceeded 
" from the imagination that belief is in no case vo- 
" luntary. Now, it is very true that we are only 
" responsible for what is voluntary, and it is also 

* Moral Feelings, p. 182. 



40 A LECTURE ON 

"true that we cannot believe without evidence. 
" But then it is a very possible thing that a doctrine 
" may possess the most abundant evidence, and yet 
" not be believed, just because we choose to shut 
" our eyes against it ; and our unbelief in this case 
" is owing not to the want of evidence, but to the 
" evidence not being attended to. Grant that be- 
" lief is not a voluntary act — it is quite enough for 
" the refutation of Lord Byron's principle, if atten- 
" Hon be a voluntary act. One attends to a subject 
" because he chooses ; or he does not attend to it 
" because he so chooses. It is the fact of the at- 
" tention being given or withheld, which forms the 
" thing that is to be morally reckoned with. And 
" if the attention has been withheld when it ought 
" to have been given, for this we are the subjects 
" of a rightful condemnation." 

I admit attention to be a voluntary act ; but, 
while insisting, for reasons hereafter explained, that 
it is not one's duty even to investigate a subject 
unless he thinks it to be his duty to do so, it is evi- 
dent that Dr. Chalmers has not met the question. 
He would instruct us that because a man has pow- 
er over his will, he can therefore control his senses ; 
because he can thrust his finger into the fire or 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 41 

withhold it, it is optional with him to be free from 
pain ; because he has the ability to reason or not, 
that is, to direct his attention, he need not come to 
any conclusion ; because he can think when he 
chooses, he can believe as he chooses. Of course 
a clear statement of the proposition carries its own 
refutation. 

It is said that because belief depends upon atten- 
tion to the evidence offered, and attention depends 
upon the will, I am therefore, in a secondary sense, 
accountable for the belief, because accountable for 
my voluntary disposition. Because not strictly 
correct, the statement is not correct at all. It is 
plain that while I can fix my attention, and look, 
I cannot tell beforehand whether the color will be 
white or l^lack ; and it is equally plain that while 
the attention is voluntary and controlled by the 
will, the belief or conclusion following the atten- 
tion, is not at all voluntar}^ And if the belief be 
not voluntary, then Byron's assertion that " Man is 
" not responsible for his belief" is unquestionably 
correct ; and it does not suffice for the refutation of 
that statement to show to show the act of attention 
to be voluntary. 

For our voluntary dispositions, for the attention, 



42 A LECTURE ON 

as the legitimate act of the person, it is said that 
we are accountable. Be it so ; but the argument 
can go no further than that. 

While the will may, and does, direct the atten- 
tion, it has no power over the belief, which results 
independently of the volition, and independently of 
the attention also. The utmost attention by differ- 
ent persons does not ensure the same belief, and 
precisely the same evidence is not always regarded 
by different persons alike ; nor does it invariably 
lead in different minds to the same conclusion. 
Nay more, the very same evidence, presented at 
different times to the same mind does not always 
lead to the same conclusion ; but in neither case is 
the conclusion a matter of will. 

Had Abercrombie and Chalmers reflected a mo- 
ment, they must have seen the manifest difference 
between attention as an act of the will, and belief 
as the result of that attention ; the one being 
voluntary, the other involuntary. 

A man who shutting his eyes fires into the street 
and kills another, is not punished for killing the 
identical person who happens to be hit, but for the 
antecedent intention and purpose of his mind. 
True, he is not punished as for murder, if no one 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 43 

be injured, because human laws take cognizance of 
overt acts merely, and of the intention only when 
it is accompanied by a result ; but in a moral aspect, 
the purpose alone is considered, as appears from 
the circumstance that where the purpose is shown 
to be wanting, no crime can be imputed. 

The voluntary disposition of the person de- 
termines the quality of his moral actions, occasions 
the sense of approval and disapproval, and renders 
him deserving of praise or blame. This the child, 
as soon as he is able to reflect, the man, and every 
body knows. 

I therefore conclude that, strictly and hence cor- 
rectly speaking, all belief — and, of course, all er- 
roneous belief — is in itself wholly involuntary ; 
and for that reason no one should be censured for 
his belief or disbelief upon any subject however 
sacred or profane, whether such belief be thought 
by others to be erroneous or not, or even perni- 
cious. 

This point, if well taken, it cannot be denied, 
strikes at the very existence of the churches, 
and is fatal to their present form of organization. 
For, were they to retain all persons of right inten- 
tions and pure dispositions, and reject all others — 



44 A LECTURE ON 

taking members for what they are, that is for their 
characters and motives rather than for their doc- 
trines — or for what they say are their doctrines — 
would not the complexion of the churches be ma- 
terially changed ? 

Right intentions do not, as has been seen, ne- 
cessarily or often ensure the same beliefs. How 
those intentions are to be arrived at, (since the 
creeds do not determine them,) whether by the as- 
sertion of the individual himself, (for he may tell an 
untruth,) or by the judgment of his fellow commu- 
nicants, (for they may be deceived,) it is difficult 
to say. I leave the solution of this hard problem 
to the churches themselves. 

The idea that men are accountable for their be- 
liefs and opinions in a secondary, but strictly incor- 
rect and most unphilosophical sense, rather than 
for conscientious action — making creed rather than 
character the criterion of morality — although it 
seems at first a trifling and unimportant distinc- 
tion, has been and is now a gross theological and 
metaphysical error — the most gross and vital in its 
effects of any recorded by history ; having needless- 
ly excited the animosity of one class or sect against 
another — of the civilized against the barbarous — of 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 45 

the Jew against the Gentile— of the Protestant 
against the Catholic. It has occasioned terrible de- 
vastating wars ; the annulling of private friendships 
and public comities ; and has inflicted incalculable 
evils upon the whole human race. 

I am aware where I stand. I stand on a platform 
which holds sectarianism, in its exclusive form, to 
be both irreligious and unphilosophical, and all wars 
of sects unholy ; which throws down the barriers 
between " evangelical " and " unevangelical " de- 
nominations, and renders meaningless those terms 
as now applied ; and which summons all men — 
Christians and Pagans — from unseemly contentions 
to obedience to the high rule of tolerance and 
charity. 

I think I have fully demonstrated the two pro- 
positions with which I set out ; namely : that sal- 
vation is not a proper incentive to the performance 
of duty ; and that belief is involuntary. 

In no sense did this so-called scheme of redemp- 
tion — salvation through faith or belief, (" the just 
shall live by faith,") — as understood by Luther and 
his followers, contain the solution of any religious 
question. It did not differ in kind from the theo- 
logy of the Roman Church. To Luther's assertion 



46 A LECTURE ON 

of the necessity of free thought, and the right of free 
speech, together with the revival of letters, must be 
attributed the great uprising of his age ; and it is 
not too much to say that Protestants, in embracing 
and giving such prominence to his religious tenets 
— especially the error of adopting creeds as a test 
of membership in their churches — have failed to 
comprehend their own history, and totally lost sight 
of the principle of personal authority and individ- 
ual judgment, which* is the foundation and root of 
every protestation they have ever uttered. 

VIII. 

Concluding Remarks. 

It must not be supposed that because beliefs 
and opinions are involuntary, they are thence un- 
important. So far as the performance of one's own 
duty goes, belief is indeed of no consequence ; be- 
cause duty does not consist in believing. But 
doubtless the happiness and well being of man- 
kind depend very much upon the opinions which 
they hold ; because men will act more or less in 
accordance with their opinions and beliefs, whether 
right or wrong. For example, public opinion re- 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 47 

specting drunkenness, slavery, and very many 
questions affecting the social relations, has within 
a few years undergone a marked change ; and thus 
have arisen in men's minds new ideas of their 
rights and duties as to those relations ; and all 
honest men will act in accordance with their new 
beliefs. 

The churches have always deemed themselves 
obliged to conform to the current notions of right 
and wrong, of virtue and vice, and have disciplined 
their members accordingly. A church member is 
now expelled for drunkenness when he would not 
have been a century ago. 

The churches practically cannot live on their 
faith alone. The faith is not enough. The con- 
duct according to the professed faith is and must 
be a necessary test in addition to the formal 
creeds. 

I am no iconoclast. I wish to have the churches, 
synagogues, mosques, and temples of all peoples 
and climes, stand just where they are unless better 
ones can be built upon their sites ; I admit the 
fact of numberless religions in the world, and do 
not forget the multitude of Christian sects ;* I recog- 

* See Appendix. Notes. 



48 A LECTURE ON 

nize the existence of martyrdom for every faith, right 
or wrong, or partly right and partly wrong. I recog- 
nize alike the great points of agreement between 
Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, and 
the minor divergences between them all. In a 
word, I recognize the voice of conscience, every 
where and among all men. And while I recognize 
these things, I desire that others shall do the same. 

Let the sectarian, whoever he may be, place his 
own church or his own sect alongside these facts 
of history, and tell us, if he can, what is the re- 
ligious element common to all religious organiza- 
tions ; what is the law of duty that applies to man 
universally. 

That such a law or principle exists — a law which 
shall solve the riddle of the broad church — precise- 
ly define the terms " virtue" and " moral obligation" 
— assign to moralities their exact place in ethics, 
and at the same time satisfactorily account for the 
different religious phases of the world, is, and 
always has been, the great, central idea of theology. 
For without such a law there is no one religion 
possible for the race. 

The lawgiver and religious instructor, of what- 
ever creed or nation, must proceed upon the as- 



,. THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 49 

sumption of one universal moral law. Upon it are 
founded our ideas of justice, of virtue, and the 
equal accountability of mankind. 

" All nations have in. truth only one religion," 
says Bucer. 

''Such a rule" (says Hickok) "must be appre- 
" hended by the subject, and thus promulgated to 
" the conscience, and must be so universal that it 
" may come home in its convictions to the con- 
" sciences of the race, otherwise there can be no 
"valid ground for a comprehensive science of 
" morals." * 

This law existed in the human mind anterior to 
the Christian revelation ; nay, it must exist apart 
from any outward revelation. 

Sir James Mackintosh remarks : " If there were 
" no foundation for morality antecedent to revealed 
" religion, we should want that important test of 
" the conformity of a revelation to pure morality 
"by which its claim to a divine origin is to be 
" tried." t 

The law is within the individual as a primary, 
axiomatic, universal intuition. A law not always 

* Moral Philosophy, p. 32. 
t Eth. Phil. p. 155. 



50 A LECTURE ON 

nor often perhaps, objectively apprehended ; but 
this is immaterial, since the deductions and analo- 
gies of science continually remind us that we live 
.under and are subject to innumerable laws of 
which we have no conception. Says Cicero : " The 
" same eternal immutable law comprehends all 
" nations, at all times, under one common Master 
" and Governor of all." 

What, then, is this rule — this religious law ? 

I know of no other than the simple law of nature 
that conviction is the criterion of duty. 

St. Paul said : " To him that esteemeth any 
" thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean." * 

And Christ : " If ye were blind ye should have 
" no sin ; but now ye say, we see ; therefore your 
" sin remaineth." f 

The followers of Zwingle said, (rather inconsist- 
ently with their creed) : " What is not faith is sin. If 
" therefore we constrain Christians to do what they 
"deem unjust we force them to sin." \ 

Luther himself declared at the diet of Worms : 
" It is neither just nor innocent to act against a 
" man's conscience." § 



* Rom. xiv, 14. + John ix. 41, 

X Merle d'Aubigne, Hist. Ref. Vol. IV. p. 73. 

I John Scott, Luther and the Lutheran Reformation, Vol. \. p. 133. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 5 1 

Rev. Henry Ward Beecher is reported to have 
said that, " Sound doctrine is truth, purity, love, 
" good works ; and bad living is heresy in the New 
" Testament. Nay," he adds, " I go further and 
" say, that nowhere in the New Testament can the 
" term heresy be found applied to any error of be- 
" lief, but only to error of life." 

No nobler thought was ever uttered than that 
attributed to Abraham Lincoln : " To do the right 
" as God gives me to see the right." 

From the recognition of this common authorita- 
tive consciousness, which declares the performance 
of duty to consist in no seeking for a personal 
benefit, and in no belief, but simply in the effort to 
live conformably to one's beliefs, however for the 
time they happen to be ; true to one's self, honestly 
and without hypocrisy, making Christianity, (or by 
whatever name it may be known,) as Coleridge has 
it, " not a theory, or a speculation, but a life — not 
" the philosophy of life, but a life and a living pro- 
" cess," will arise the New Church, (if a Church be 
possible,) the coming Reformation. 

Has it not already begun ? 

I can only advert to it, but it would be easy to 
demonstrate how the present various religious 



52 A LECTURE ON 

movements are vindicating my conclusions, not 
merely in an occasional manner, but in their whole 
tendency ; how free thought, liberal sentiments, 
and the multiplying diversities of opinion conse- 
quent upon an increasing intelligence, are pro^ 
ducing those mental and social conditions which 
will ere long render it impossible to hold any body 
of men together by what are called " essential 
" truths." Instead of vainly striving for a unity 
of belief, it will be seen that civilization advances 
in the precise ratio of the multiplication of beliefs. 
The human intellect will then be truly free. 

Bound to no assumed facts or asserted au- 
thoritative data, the lover of science will pursue his 
investigations without fear of discrediting the 
statements of the Bible ; and the theologian will 
find something better to do than wasting his time 
in childish disputes respecting the construction, 
interpretation, and truth of that book. 

Such beliefs and opinions as do not aifect the 
well being of mankind will be deemed of little ac- 
count, and efforts tending to elevate humanity will 
soon, in one form or another, take the place of 
liturgy and creed. 

But I charge evangelical clergymen with incon- 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 53 

sistency. Without committing myself to the 
" higher law" doctrine,* I desire to inquire whether 
the recognition of that doctrine by them, (and it is 
quite general,) detracts nothing from the force of 
the Thirty-Nine Articles ? Are we to be told, and 
to believe because so told, that right is really a 
relative idea ? that conviction of duty is the only 
guide to its performance, and, in the same breath, 
that there is some other guide ? Shall we accept 
the higher law of moral obligation, and with it the 
lower rule of the Church ? Shall we declare for 
free will, for a conscious moral volition, and be 
bound down to a belief to which our understanding 
refuses its assent ? 

The intelligence of the masses has already risen 
to the level of these questions, and is demonstrat- 
ing how a people will be provided with that re- 
ligion, as well as political life, for which they are 
fitted. 

The clergy, orthodox and heterodox, conceding 
something to the popular sentiment, have pretty 
much left off talking about the creed, except for 
church and state purposes, and tell us now that 
faith is not bare belief ; but hope, trust, enthusiasm, 

* See Appendix. Note 3. 



54 A LECTURE ON 

sentiment ; a matter of the heart, love of God, love 
of mankind ; a living faith ; a state of mind which, 
according to Aquinas, leads to belief — almost any- 
thing and everything except belief; that religion 
has passed historically from belief into feeling, and 
from feeling into action — into good works, charitable 
objects, and the like, wherein all can be agreed. 

Do they really think so ? Is there a Church 
which will accept, as its condition of membership, 
the definition which St. James gives of religion : 
" Pure religion and undefiled, before God, even the 
'* Father, is this : To visit the widows and the fa- 
" therless in their affliction, so as to keep oneself 
" unspotted from the world " ? * 

Can you, O most moral, philanthropic, conscien- 
tious man, connect yourself with their body ? Try 
it. Are you excluded by no want of faith, by no 
heretical doctrine } Their churches and Christian 
associations, founded in the eternal fitness of things, 
deny that they are conventional bodies, with arbi- 
trary rules, and claim to be holy catholic churches, 
and evangelical associations with broad aisles and 
open doors. To the communion of those churches 



* James i. 27. Our common version does not quite hit the meaning of the 
original. I translate it as it should be i-endered. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 55 

are invited every tongue and tribe upon the ha- 
bitable globe, and vast expenditures for tracts 
and missionaries attest how sincere and urgent is 
the invitation. But the poor heathen scarcely ap- 
proaches the door of the sanctuary before he dis- 
covers some stumbling-block in the shape of a 
creed, which he is enjoined to believe, but which 
no one fully understands, and about which few agree. 

Can it be wondered at that the heathen and un- 
cultivated remain unconverted to propositions which 
even the most enlightened and cultivated fail to 
comprehend ? * 

The pagan is told that the Bible is an authority. 
But how, as a bare authority, is it preferable to 
the Vedas ? For the authority is not in the Bible 
itself, nor in those who wrote it, but in him who 
reads it and passes upon it. As an authority per 
se, admitting of no question or comment, (and if 
authoritative it cannot be questioned), it can have 
no greater force than any other book. 

I concede to the Bible all the weight to which it 
is entitled in the light of my own judgment. No 
other test is possible by me than that. 

* See Appendix. Note 4. 



56 A LECTURE ON 

Religion, in its noblest, broadest acceptation, re- 
cognizes no ultimate authority foreign to the per- 
son himself. It defines no peculiar belief or creed 
which is orthodox to-day and heterodox to-morrow. 
The aspirations of the Christian Church toward its 
highest ideals, regardless of creeds, account suffi- 
ciently for its past successes. It has an aspect 
apart from its speculative theology. 

With increasing intelligence and a higher moral 
culture, has come a juster sense of mutual relations 
and responsibilities ; and the conformity of men to 
those ideas in any age, measures in history the 
Christianity as well as civilization of that period.* 

Certain Churches have attempted to evade the 
question of the essential character of beliefs by 
putting articles of faith to vote, and then promul- 
gating them as a mere statement of the belief of 
the members, as their " average sentiment," with- 
out imposing them upon the individual conscience. 
But it must be perfectly evident that so soon as a 
Church relinquishes the essential character of its 
creeds, and simply holds itself out merely as a body 
of men professing a common faith, it has lost its 
claim to be called a Church, in any received accep- 

* See Appendix. Note 5. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 57 

tation of the term, and admits itself to be without 
ecclesiastical authority. 

The religious spirit of our age, advancing in the 
direction we have been pursuing, seeks something 
better than the restoration of a belief — even of one 
universal belief — or of a spiritual unity. It de- 
mands the statement of a rational principle which 
logically deduces morality from the sense of moral 
obligation ; to faith adds works ; justifies all truly 
good men, of whatever creed or race, who have ever 
lived ; and, throwing open the door for investiga- 
tion, finds use for the material already acquired in 
the march of general improvement. Especially 
does it aim to abate the rancor of sectarianism, by 
uniting in closer bonds the human family. To 
this end the material and commercial interests of 
the world are rapidly leading. To this end science 
is also tending. 

And if it can be affirmed that the performance 
of duty consists neither in believing nor in disbe- 
lieving ; but in being true to one's self, in a con- 
tinual advancement toward the highest ideal 
whether that ideal be in reason, sentiment, reve- 
lation, inspiration, the inner light, or in whatever 
else it consists, or whatever else it be called — so 



58 A LECTURE ON 

that it meets with a personal approval— then there 
is eliminated from theology that which occasions 
sects. And in emerging from them, we embrace 
at once in our communion the whole human brother- 
hood. 

" An eloquent preacher, Richard Mott, in a dis- 
" course of much unction and pathos, is said to 
" have exclaimed aloud to his congregation, that he 
" did not believe there was a Quaker, Presbyterian, 
" Methodist, or Baptist, in Heaven. Having paused 
" to give his audience time to stare and to wonder, 
" he said, that in Heaven, God knew no distinction, 
" but considered all good men as his children, and 
" as brethren of the same family.* 

The same question which caused the Lutheran 
Reformation still remains to be settled : Shall 
authority external to the person, and predicated on 
an assumption over the person, triumph, or shall the 
person himself triumph over that authority } Lu- 
ther scouted papal authority, but he set himself up 
in its place and stead as an authority from which 
there should be no appeal. And wherever to-day 
in the Christian Church we have not papal Rome, 
we have Luther, or Calvin, or somebody else. 

* Letter of Thomas Jefferson. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 59 

The " essential truths " — those so-called truths 
and formulas constituting the essence of the Pro- 
testant Church, bereft of which it would cease to 
exist — are without doubt the same in kind as those 
constituting the essence of the Roman Catholic 
Church, whether regarded as authority superior to 
reason and ignoring it, or as theories essentially 
unreasonable in themselves. 

However much Luther may have scouted the 
argument of the papal legate, from their common 
stand point, it was conclusively against him. " If 
" every one were at liberty to bring back into dis- 
" cussion points which for ages have been settled 
" by the church and by councils, nothing would 
" be certain and fixed, doctrine or dogma, and there 
" would be no belief which men must adhere to un- 
" der pain of eternal damnation." 

Dr. Dix, the Rector of Trinity Church, New 
York, in a recent discourse admitted, with great 
precision and frankness, that between external au- 
thority and private judgment, there was no middle 
ground ; and upon that rock of authority he 
planted his church. There let it rest. If this age 
of free thought and general intelligence prefers 
tradition to reason in rnatters of religion when th^ 



6o A LECTURE ON 

issue is squarely made, we must perforce be con- 
tent 

There is more to be feared from the influence of 
those representative liberal men who starting from 
right premises, and admitting the necessity of 
private judgment, still find some excuse for 
erroneous conclusions ; who, while acknowledging 
the fact that the Church Universal lies beyond the 
narrow bounds of sectarianism, still cling to old 
ideas as fixed and unalterable ; as " points which 
" for ages have been settled ;" and insist on their 
reception, not because they are reasonable, but 
because they seem necessary (as they undoubtedly 
are) to the maintenance of an established, visible 
Church, because the Church cannot exist without 
them. And, on the other hand, thinking the 
Church to be a divine authoritative institution, 
having grown up with the notion that to assail it, 
however lightly, is nothing less than sacrilege, 
there comes upon them a mistrust that reason can 
afford no solution to the questions which agitate 
the religious world. 

A distinguished Unitarian clergyman, in a ser- 
mon which created at the time of its publication a 
profound sensation says, " There are truths in 
" regard to politics, society, religion, history, Chri§. 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 6l 

" tianity, manners, science, art, which are no longer 
" properly in debate. True they are debated, as 
*' Hazlitt debated the Newtonian astronomy ; as 
" Godwin debated the existence of society ; as 
" Buckle debates the influence of religion on civili- 
" zation ; but they are debated only by eccentric, 
" abnormal, or presumptuous minds — minds out of 
" pitch in the great concert of the race." He calls 
" it a perilous folly" to allow polity, morals, religion, 
to be wholly open questions.* 

But can the reverend gentleman inform us 
precisely what truths are really fixed ? what 
questions are not open ? He says there are cer- 
tain ones not even to be discussed. He sets up 
" truths" for us to take as authoritative. f This is 
the old question, and the real issue. The general 
assertion, and assumption without proof, that there 
are " truths no longer in debate" will not satisfy 
this generation. Do the ever-varying discoveries 
in science and psychology confirm it } Do the 
indefinitely multiplying ideas and diversities of 
opinion which distinguish civilized and thinking 
from barbarous nations confirm it ? Have our 
Orthodox Churches in their Union Meetings and 

* Sequel to " The Suspense of Faith," by Rev. Dr. Bellows, Sept. 25, 1859. 
+ See Appendix. Note 6. 



62 A LECTURE ON 

Evangelical Alliances, yet found a common ground 
of union ? Is the present political, religious, and 
moral condition of our own favored land, where 
the people are taught to read and reflect, such that 
we can infer stability from intellectuality, or hope 
for any nearer approach to universal agreement? 
Why, this is just the inevitable conflict of the 
age ; not of the new against the old, but of inves- 
tigation against assumption ; of doubts against 
established systems ; of opinion against usurped 
authority ; of inquiry against dogmatism and 
superstition. On the one hand are arrayed tradi- 
tions, mysteries, proscription, slavery ; on the 
other, intelligence, humanity, liberty. To the for- 
mer belong the cramped and crowded intellect, 
temporal power and oppression, the divine right of 
kings ; to the latter, freedom, individuality, and 
mental enfranchisement. 

Again, religion must, so far as it is to be reasona- 
ble, necessarily rest on the conclusions of reason. 

Cousin rightly declares that whatever is purely 
sentimental or emotional ; which, expunging 
reason, leaves nothing in its place but " ecstacy" 
or "abstraction" — which promises me a super- 
human science on the condition of my first losing 
consciousness, thought, liberty, memory, all that 



THE PROTESTANT FAITH. 63 

constitutes me an intelligent and moral being — is 
without the pale of speculation, and unreasonable ; 
for it uses reason to deny reason. 

On the contrary, the reason, so far as it is the 
expression of man's self-consciousness, is and must 
be supreme, and its deductions are unanswerable, 
and without appeal. 

The universal conscience is likewise incontro- 
vertible, being nearest in us to what is divine. 

" The Word proclaimed by the concordant voice 
Of mankind fails not ; for in man speaks God." * 

I appeal to the natural law, which, fixed and 
eternal, guides alike the planets, in their immense 
courses, and humarrwanderings however erratic, in 
a predetermined orbit. 

" Oh, backward looking son of time, 
The new is old, the old is new ; 
The cycle of a change sublime 
Still sweeping through. 
* -jf * * 

" Take heart ! the waster builds again 
A charmed life old goodness hath ; 
The tares may perish ; but the grain 
Is not for death." f 

* Hesiod, Work and Days. 
t John G. Whittier. 



APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX- 



NOTE I. Page 24. 

" Let the Christian reader's first object always be to find out 
"the literal meaning of the Word of God ; for on this and this 
" alone is the whole foundation of faith and Christian theolo- 
" gy." — Luther, Exposition of the Book of Detiteronomy. 

NOTE 2. Page 47. 

" It is a lamentable fact that throughout the whole world 
" there is no system of religion, the votaries of which are sub- 
" divided into so many sectaries as those who profess an ad- 
" herence to the Christian faith." — Thomas T>icyl^ Influence of 
Knowledge on Morals, p. 115. 

The following is a recent enumeration of some of the differ- 
ent religious sects in Great Britain and the United States : 
Apostolics, Armenian, New Society Baptists, Baptized Be- 
lievers, Believers in Christ, Bible Christians, Bible Defence 
Association, Brethren, Calvinists, Calvinistic Baptists, Ca- 
tholic and Apostolic Church, Christians who object to be 
otherwise designated. Christian Believers, Christian Brethren, 
Christian Eliasites, Christian Israelites, Christian Teetotallers 
Christian Temperance Men, Christian Unionists, Church of 
Scotland, Church of Christ, Countess of Huntingdon's Con- 



68 APPENDIX. 

nection, Disciples in Christ, Eastern Orthodox Greek Church, 
Electics, Episcopalians, Dissenters, Evangelical Unionists, 
Followers of the Lord Jesus Christ, Free Grace Gospel Chris- 
tians, Free Gospel Church, Free Christians, Free Church 
(Episcopal), Free Church of England, Free Union Church, 
General Baptist, General Baptist New Connection, German 
Lutheran, Hallelujah Band, Independents, Independent Re- 
ligious Reformers, Independent Unionists, Inghamites, Jews, 
Modern Methodists, Mormons or Latter Day Saints, New Con- 
nection of Wesleyans, New Jerusalem Church or Swedenbor- 
gians. Old Baptists, Original Connection of Wesleyans, Ply- 
mouth Brethren, Peculiar People, Dunkers, Mennonites, Pres- 
byterian Church in England, Primitive Methodists, Progres- 
sionists, Protestants adhering to the Articles of the Church of 
England I. to XVIII. inclusive, but rejecting order and ritual. 
Providence Quakers, Ranters, Reformers, Reformed Presbyte- 
rians or Covenanters, Recreative Religionists, Refuge Metho- 
dists, Reform Free Church of Wesleyan Methodists, Revival- 
ists, Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, Salem Society, Sandema- 
nians, Scotch Baptists, Second Advent Brethren, Separatists 
(Protestant), Seventh Day Baptists, Testimony Congregational 
Church, Trinitarians, Union Baptists, Unitarians, -Unitarian 
Christian, United Christian Church, United Free Methodist 
Church, United Brethren or Moravians, United Presbyterian, 
Unitarian Baptists, Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, Welsh 
Free Presbyterians, Wesleyan Methodist Association, Wesley- 
an Reformers, Wesleyan Reform Glory Band, Orthodox, 
Friends or Quakers, Hicksite Friends, and many others. 

There are said to be more than a thousand different religious 
systems among mankind, but, in the words of Locke, " should 



APPENDIX. " 69 

" any one a little catechise the greater part of the partisans of 
" most of the sects in the world, he would not find concerning 
" those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any 
" opinions of their own." — Essay on the Human Understanding, 
p. 464. 

NOTE 3. Page 53. 

" I perfectly agree with my brother Heath in reprobating any 
" distinction between mahun prohibittwi z.x\6i mahijn in j^, and 
" consider it pregnant with mischief." — Rooke, J., in Aubert 
V. Maze 2 Bos. and Pul. 371, A.D. 1801. 

" The morality of the position of the learned commentator 
" [Blackstone] has been well questioned. Its soundness as a 
" legal principle, though it once had sway in the courts, has 
•'been since repudiated." — i Sharsivood's Blac. Com. p. 58 {note 
by Editor). 

NOTE 4. Page 55. 

" I have never united myself to any Church, because I have 
" found difficulty in giving my assent, without mental reserva- 
" tion, to the long, complicated statements of Christian doctrine 
" which characterize their Articles of Belief and Confession of 

" Faith." — Abraham Lincoln, Carpenter s Six Months at the 

White House, p. 190. 

NOTE 5. Page 56. 
"The measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed 
" virtue and vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or 
" blame, which by a secret or tacit consent, establishes itself 
" in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the 
" world ; whereby several actions come to find credit or dis- 



70 APPENDIX. 

"grace among them according to the judgment, maxims, or 
" fashions of that place." — Locke, Essay on the Human Under- 
standings p. 336, § 10. 

NOTE 6. Page 61. 

Dr. Bellows, in a letter from Chamouni, Savoy, dated Sep- 
tember 15, 1867, comments in this fashion upon the manner of 
worship at the English Chapel in that place : " Any one who 
" watches the girls and boys, the young women and young 
" men, saying the creed of the English Liturgy, with an implicit 
" reverence, into which thought and choice evidently enter 
" very little, sees plainly that the theory is not to encourage 
" any thought or choice about it, but to take the best means 
" for stamping a faith which has been thought out and agreed 
" upon by competent persons, upon those who are probably 
" to have no faith, or only a very foolish and ineffectual one, 
" if they are not thus furnished. There is an immense deal to 
"be said in favor of this side of the question." — New-York 
^'Liberal Christian" November 2, 1867. 



THE END 





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